Abstract: The ability to certifiably delete plaintext data is an emerging cryptographic application of quantum information. This tutorial will focus on the notion of everlasting security, which considers the following experiment. Initially, a computationally-bounded adversary receives a computationally-hiding commitment to some plaintext. Later, they issue a (classical) certificate attesting that they destroyed the underlying plaintext information via an irreversible measurement. If the certificate is found to be valid, it is guaranteed that the plaintext is now information-theoretically removed from the adversary’s view. That is, they cannot recover the plaintext even if they become computationally unbounded or receive the secret key that allows them to open the original commitment.
Bio: James Bartusek is a PhD candidate at UC Berkeley, where he is advised by Sanjam Garg. He is broadly interested in cryptography, with a focus on its interface with quantum information. Previously, he obtained a BSE and MSE at Princeton, where he was advised by Mark Zhandry.