#### From the Hardness of Detecting Superpositions to Cryptography:

#### **Quantum Public Key Encryption and Commitments**

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#### QCrypt 2023

based on the joint work with

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## Contribution of [HMY'23]

- 1. New *quantum* search-to-decision reduction
  - Based on a recent work of Aaronson, Atia, Susskind
  - Simple & Interesting properties: Locality preserving, with (quantum) advice
  - Similar ideas implicitly appeared in previous works (quantum Goldreich-Levin, ...)
- 2. Applications to Quantum Cryptography
  - New public key encryption based on non-abelian group action
  - Efficient flavor conversion of quantum bit commitments previous: *O*(λ<sup>2</sup>)-multiplicative factor [CLS01,Yan22] ours: *O*(1)-additive factor

Open problem in [JQSY19]

Original motivation was

from quantum gravity

Concurrent work [GJMZ23]

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#### Main Toolkit Background

Susskind cared a "macroscopic" quantum state of space-time

 $|BlackHole\rangle + |NoBlackHole\rangle$ 

#### 2

Susskind conjectured:

Complexity( Seeing interference between  $|v\rangle$  and  $|w\rangle$ )  $\approx$  Complexity( Mapping  $|v\rangle$  to  $|w\rangle$  or vice versa)

... I cannot understand why

## Schrödinger's cat

- 1. Prepare a cat in ket.
- 2. Measure if a single atom decaying or not.  $\left(\frac{|decaying\rangle + |not\rangle}{\sqrt{2}}\right)$
- 3. If decaying kill the cat; do nothing otherwise.



### Schrödinger's cat

According to quantum physics, the cat is simultaneously alive and dead.



## Detecting interference

Distinguishing classical from quantum = Detecting interference (convexity)





#### Theorem for Schrödinger's cat

Our primary task is to distinguish the following two states.



[Aaronson, Atia, Susskind'20] This task is *computationally* equivalent to the task to *swap*  $| \not \square \rangle$  and  $| \not \square \rangle$ , meaning that a unitary U such that

*Detecting superposition* in Schrödinger's cat is as hard as *resurrecting a dead cat* to alive (Necromancy-hard)

#### Formal Theorem [Aaronson, Atia, Susskind arXiv:2009.07450]

Let  $|x\rangle$ ,  $|y\rangle$  be two orthogonal states,  $|\psi\rangle = \frac{|x\rangle + |y\rangle}{\sqrt{2}}$ ,  $|\phi\rangle = \frac{|x\rangle - |y\rangle}{\sqrt{2}}$ . For any  $\Delta > 0$ , the following have the same circuit complexity up to O(1) 1) A unitary U such that  $\frac{|\langle y|U|x\rangle + \langle x|U|y\rangle|}{2} = \Delta$ 2) An algorithm A such that  $|\Pr[A|\psi\rangle \rightarrow 1] - \Pr[A|\phi\rangle \rightarrow 1]| = \Delta$ 

[HMorimaeYamakawa]

We prove the same result with ancillary qubits, find some properties, ...

#### Proof by circuits



swap to distinguish



distinguish to swap

# CS / Cryptographic interpretation



- (SAT) If we can efficiently decide if a formula has a solution, then we can find a solution of a formula.
- (Crypto) If one-way function exists, then there is a unpredictable bit.

AAS equivalence theorem shows a new quantum search-to-decision reduction.

## AAS theorem as search-to-decision reduction

#### AAS theorem is **a new** *quantum* **search-to-decision reduction**. This is our main message.

Similar ideas are implicitly used in literature

- Quantum Goldreich-Levin theorem
- Some technical parts of collapsing/collapse-binding literatures (pure vs mixed instead of interference)

We found new applications in quantum cryptography

- Quantum-ciphertext public key encryptions from non-abelian group action
- Efficient flavor conversion of quantum bit commitments

## Example: Quantum Goldreich-Levin theorem

One-way permutation is  $P: [N] \rightarrow [N]$  that is

- easy to compute forward  $(|x, 0\rangle \rightarrow |x, P(x)\rangle$  is easy for any x)
- hard to invert  $(|P(x), 0\rangle \rightarrow |P(x), x\rangle$  is hard for random x)

Question: Can we extract "hard-to-predict" **bit** from this inversion-hard function?

[Goldreich-Levin]  $r \cdot x$  is hard to compute given (P(x), r).

A quantum proof by [Adcock&Cleve'02] We can interpret it using the equivalence theorem.

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Equivalently, it is hard to swap  $|P(x), 0, 0\rangle$  and  $|P(x), 1, x\rangle$ 

By AAS equivalence, it is hard to distinguish  $|P(x)\rangle \otimes \frac{|0,0\rangle \pm |1,x\rangle}{\sqrt{2}}$ 

#### Example: Quantum Goldreich-Levin theorem

It is hard to distinguish

$$|P(x)\rangle \otimes \frac{|0,0\rangle \pm |1,x\rangle}{\sqrt{2}}$$

Measure the second parts on a Hadamard basis.

- $|P(x)\rangle \otimes \sum_{r} |r \cdot x, r\rangle$  if the sign is +
- $|P(x)\rangle \otimes \sum_{r} |r \cdot x \bigoplus 1, r\rangle$  if the sign is -

Two states are hard to distinguish, i.e., computing  $r \cdot x$  from (P(x), r) is hard!

#### Applications

Swapping  $|x\rangle$  and  $|y\rangle$  is equivalent to distinguishing  $|x\rangle \pm |y\rangle$ 

- Quantum-ciphertext PKE from non-abelian group action Previously, only minicrypt constructions are known
- Efficient flavor conversion of quantum bit commitment Two definitions of commitments are essentially the same

#### Cryptographic (non-abelian) group action

Group *G* and set *S*, group action  $G \times S \rightarrow S$  denoted by  $(g,s) \mapsto g \cdot s$ :  $e \cdot s = s$ ,  $g \cdot (h \cdot s) = (gh) \cdot s$ 

(One-way)	Hard to find $g$ from $(s, g \cdot s)$	$(s, g \cdot s) \mapsto g$ is hard
(Pseudorandom)	$(s, g \cdot s)$ looks like random $(s, t)$	$(s, g \cdot s) \approx (s, t)$

PKE from non-abelian group action is an open problem posed in [JQSY19]

Abelian group actions naturally allow Diffie-Hellman style key exchange Alice:  $(g, g \cdot s)$  Bob:  $(h, h \cdot s)$ , share  $(g \cdot s, h \cdot s)$  then each can compute  $(gh) \cdot s = g \cdot (h \cdot s) = h \cdot (g \cdot s) = (hg) \cdot s$ 

[HMorimaeYamakawa] Quantum PKE from non-abelian group action

Classical construction (possibility)

• Quantum construction (Our)

#### Contributions in diagram (+ more)



[HMorimaeYamakawa] Quantum PKE from non-abelian group action

#### PKE from non-abelian group action, idea

Possible via AAS equivalence theorem albeit with quantum ciphertexts Encode bit in *phase* 



AAS theorem: Distinguishing  $|\phi^0\rangle$  from  $|\phi^1\rangle$  is at least as hard as finding a map from  $|s\rangle$  to  $|g \cdot s\rangle$ ; it probably know g, breaking one-wayness

#### PKE from non-abelian group action

For a public key  $(s_0 = s, s_1 = g \cdot s)$ , a ciphertext of b is of the form  $|\phi^b\rangle \propto |0\rangle \sum_{h:h\cdot s_0=y} |h\rangle + (-1)^b |1\rangle \sum_{h:h\cdot s_1=y} |h\rangle$ 

for random  $y \in S$ .

- easily constructible
- 1. Prepare  $\sum_{h \in G} |0\rangle |h\rangle + (-1)^b |1\rangle |h\rangle$
- 2. Append new register and compute  $\sum_{h \in G} |0\rangle |h\rangle |h \cdot s_0\rangle + (-1)^b |1\rangle |h\rangle |h \cdot s_1\rangle$
- 3. Measure the last register to obtain y, which collapses to the ciphertext.
- if underlying action is pseudorandom
- if underlying action is one-way,

Cf) Inspired by the "win-win" result of [Zha19]

then it is IND-CPA secure then it is IND-CPA secure ... or we can construct a one-shot signature

#### (Non-interactive) Bit commitment

#### Sender A vs Receiver B



# Security of Bit commitment

#### Sender A vs Receiver B

Sender commit a bit b,<br/>and later can reveal "it's the commitment of b."Receiver cannot know b until reveal.HidingSender can't change b after commit.Binding

We want the binding/hiding statistically hold, which is impossible (even for quantum)

Relax one of them by secure against (non-uniform) polynomial time algorithms.

- 1. (Statistically) Hiding commitment
- 2. (Statistically) Binding commitment



# (Canonical) Quantum bit commitment



#### More on AAS equivalence



Locality-preserving:

If A (or U) does not act on some qubits, then U (or A) does not act on those qubits either.

Advice version:

The theorem holds even if there is ancillary qubits (with a worse bound)

#### Efficient conversion (hiding $\Leftrightarrow$ binding), idea

 $|U_0|0\rangle = |\phi_0\rangle_C$  and  $|U_1|0\rangle = |\phi_1\rangle_{CR}$  be the commitment states;  $|\phi_b\rangle_{CR}$ Sender holds the reveal register R b=1 and sends the commitment register C. Hiding/Biding have the following locality features. commit = register C (Hiding)  $|\phi_0\rangle_{CR}$  and  $|\phi_1\rangle_{CR}$  are hard to distinguish by unitary over C (Binding)  $|\phi_0\rangle_{CR}$  and  $|\phi_1\rangle_{CR}$  are hard to swap by unitary over R Let  $|\psi_b\rangle = \frac{|\phi_0\rangle + (-1)^b |\phi_1\rangle}{\sqrt{2}}$ , then AAS theorem says that b=1!! (Binding) swapping  $|\phi_0\rangle_{CR}$  and  $|\phi_1\rangle_{CR}$ by unitary over R open = register R distinguishing  $|\psi_0\rangle_{CR}$  and  $|\psi_1\rangle_{CR}$ (Hiding') by unitary over R

Not orthogonal

#### Our compiler

 $U_0|0\rangle = |\phi_0\rangle_{CR}$  and  $U_1|0\rangle = |\phi_1\rangle_{CR}$  be the commitment states

The new commitment scheme commits b by  $\frac{|0\rangle|\phi_0\rangle+(-1)^b|1\rangle|\phi_1\rangle}{\sqrt{2}}$ 

1) If original scheme is X-hiding then new scheme is X-binding

2) If original scheme if Y-binding then new scheme is Y-hiding X,Y=perfect, statistical, computational

Concurrent work by Gunn, Ju, Ma, Zhandry

#### Conclusion

1. New quantum search-to-decision reduction based on the equivalence theorem [AAS20] of detecting interference and swapping two states, with some generalizations.

- 2. Showing the power of new reduction by applications
  - New quantum-ciphertext PKE from non-abelian group action
  - Efficient quantum commitment flavor conversion

# Thanks!

Any question?

## Annoying definition of "swapping"

Swapping advantage is highly non-standard.

Orthogonality/specific target are annoying.  $\frac{|\langle y|U|x\rangle + \langle x|U|y\rangle|}{2} = \Delta$ 

We may need to do a large amount of extra works for obtaining a bound on the usual definition something like:  $\frac{|\langle y|U|x\rangle|^2 + |\langle x|U|y\rangle|^2}{|\langle y|U|x\rangle|^2 + |\langle x|U|y\rangle|^2}$ 

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#### Alternative version from [GJMZ23]

Hermitian  $W = \Pi_{\pm 1} - \Pi_{-1}$  where  $\Pi_{\pm 1}$  are the  $\pm 1$  eigenspaces of WA quantum state  $|\psi\rangle$  is **chosen by adversary**. Let  $|\psi_{\pm}\rangle = \Pi_{\pm 1} |\psi\rangle$ , the following two advantages are similar: 1) Distinguishing  $\Pi_{b} |\psi\rangle$  for unknown  $b \in \{\pm 1\}$ . 2) Mapping  $\Pi_{\pm 1} |\psi\rangle$  into **any** state in  $\Pi_{\mp 1}$ , or  $||\Pi_{-1}U\Pi_{\pm 1} |\psi\rangle||^{2}$ 

If we simply write  $\Pi_b = |b\rangle\langle b| \otimes I$  and  $|\psi\rangle = |0, x\rangle + |1, y\rangle$ , it says TFAE:

- 1) Distinguishing  $|0, x\rangle \pm |1, y\rangle$
- 2) Mapping  $|0, x\rangle$  to  $|1, \star\rangle$

# Collapsing version from [Zha22]

Recall that distinguishing  $|x\rangle \pm |y\rangle$  is equivalent to the distinguishing  $|x\rangle + |y\rangle$  and (1/2,x),(1/2,y)

which is equivalent to distinguishing  $|x\rangle + |y\rangle$  from *its measurement result!* In general, we can extend it for one direction: let  $x_i$  be orthogonal and let **q: poly** 

$$|\psi\rangle = \sum_{0 \le j < q} |x_j, y_j\rangle$$

we can show that distinguishing  $|\psi\rangle$  from its measurement result using a binary measurement P is hard if the following holds:

- 1. Measure  $|\psi\rangle$  with  $\{|x_j\rangle\langle x_j|\otimes I\}$  and obtain j with  $|x_j, y_j\rangle$  with prob  $||y_j\rangle|^2$
- 2. Apply P to the result
- 3. Measure it again with  $\{|x_j\rangle\langle x_j|\otimes I\}$ , then whp the result is j again.